In May 1787, delegates from twelve states met in Philadelphia with permission from Congress only to revise the Articles of Confederation. By September they had written a new frame of government that the Articles had no procedure for, and they then had to win over special conventions in at least nine states. Both fights turned on a question the Revolution had left open: how strong could a central government become before it threatened the liberty that independence was supposed to protect?
Why the delegates started over
Topic 3.7 covers the Articles' failures. What matters here is how they set the agenda in Philadelphia. Congress could not tax, so it begged the states for money through requisitions that mostly went unpaid, and it could not pay its war debts or its soldiers. It could not regulate trade, so states taxed one another's goods and Britain closed its West Indies ports to American ships without fear of retaliation. And when indebted farmers in western Massachusetts shut down courts to stop foreclosures in Shays' Rebellion (1786-1787), Congress could do nothing; a privately funded state militia put it down. To men like James Madison and Alexander Hamilton, the rebellion and the paper-money and debt-relief laws passed by several state legislatures were the same disease: too much power in local majorities and too little in any national authority.
A September 1786 meeting at Annapolis on trade drew delegates from only five states, so it called for a broader convention. Congress endorsed the Philadelphia meeting in February 1787. Every state but Rhode Island sent delegates, 55 in all, mostly lawyers, merchants and planters, many of them veterans of the Continental Army or Congress. George Washington presided. The delegates met in secret, which let them change their minds without public pressure; most of what we know comes from Madison's private notes, published in 1840.
The compromises that built the Constitution
The first argument was over who would be represented, people or states. Madison's Virginia Plan, presented by Edmund Randolph on May 29, proposed a two-house legislature with both houses apportioned by population, a national veto over state laws, and separate executive and judicial branches. That was a design for a national government acting on individuals. The small states answered on June 15 with William Paterson's New Jersey Plan: keep a one-house Congress in which every state had one vote, as under the Articles, but give it power to collect import duties and regulate trade. Underneath were two theories. Large states argued that a republic represents people, so Virginia (about 750,000 people at the 1790 census) deserved more weight than Delaware (about 59,000). Small states argued that the states were sovereign equals who had formed a union, so each deserved an equal voice.
Roger Sherman and Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut brokered the Great (Connecticut) Compromise, adopted on July 16 by five states to four with Massachusetts divided: the House of Representatives would be apportioned by population and would originate all revenue bills, and the Senate would give each state two members chosen by its legislature. The margin shows how close the convention came to breaking up. Similar bargains settled the executive. Delegates who wanted Congress to pick the president feared a puppet; delegates who wanted a popular vote distrusted voters spread across a huge country. The Electoral College, with each state getting electors equal to its senators plus representatives, split the difference. Topic 3.9 covers the finished structure: federalism, separation of powers, and checks and balances.
Slavery in the bargain
Delegates also bargained over slavery, and these compromises shaped politics until the Civil War.
- Three-fifths clause (Article I, Section 2). Southern delegates wanted enslaved people counted in full for House seats, while northerners like Gouverneur Morris did not want them counted at all. The convention borrowed a 1783 formula Congress had used for tax requisitions: count "three fifths of all other persons" for both representation and direct taxes. Since the federal government rarely levied direct taxes, the practical effect was extra House seats, and therefore extra electoral votes, for slaveholding states.
- Slave trade clause (Article I, Section 9). South Carolina and Georgia threatened to reject any plan that banned the Atlantic slave trade. A committee proposed protecting the trade until 1800; on August 25, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney moved to extend it to 1808, and the motion passed seven states to four, with New Hampshire, Massachusetts and Connecticut all voting yes. New England's votes were part of a deal: the Deep South dropped its demand that laws regulating commerce need a two-thirds vote. Congress could tax imported people up to $10 each, and Article V barred any amendment to this clause before 1808. Congress banned the importation of enslaved people as soon as it could, effective January 1, 1808, but the domestic slave trade continued and grew.
- Fugitive slave clause (Article IV, Section 2). A "person held to service or labour" who escaped to another state had to be returned.
The words "slave" and "slavery" never appear in the original Constitution. The evasion was deliberate. During the slave trade debate, Madison's notes record:
Mr. MADISON thought it wrong to admit in the Constitution the idea that there could be property in men.
Historians still argue about what that silence meant. Paul Finkelman calls the Constitution a proslavery compact: it protected the trade for twenty years, enlarged slaveholders' power in Congress and the Electoral College, and committed free states to returning escapees. Abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison called it "a covenant with death" in the 1840s. Sean Wilentz (No Property in Man, 2018) argues instead that refusing to recognize slaves as property in national law left room for the antislavery politics of the 1850s. Both sides agree on the core fact for the exam: the Union was made possible by compromises that protected slavery.
Federalists and Anti-Federalists
Article VII said the Constitution would take effect when special ratifying conventions in nine of the thirteen states approved it. Both parts of that rule were strategic. The Articles required all thirteen state legislatures to approve any amendment, so Rhode Island alone could have blocked the plan. Conventions elected for the purpose also bypassed state politicians who would lose power, and they let supporters claim the Constitution rested on the people themselves.
Supporters took the name Federalists, a shrewd choice, since in 1787 "federal" suggested a league of states, the very thing they were replacing. Their opponents were stuck with Anti-Federalists, a name that sounded purely negative. Most Anti-Federalists agreed the Articles needed repair. They objected to this cure.
| Question | Federalists | Anti-Federalists |
|---|---|---|
| Can a republic cover a large territory? | Yes. A large republic contains so many interests that no single faction can dominate. | No. Following Montesquieu, republics must be small so that citizens know and control their rulers; a large one drifts toward monarchy or aristocracy. |
| Where should power lie? | A strong national government able to tax, raise armies, regulate commerce, and act directly on citizens. | Mostly in the states. A Congress that could tax without limit, armed with the "necessary and proper" clause (power to pass any law needed to carry out its listed powers) and the supremacy clause (federal law overrides conflicting state law), would swallow the states in one "consolidated" government. |
| Is representation adequate? | Representatives elected from large districts will be the most capable and least swayed by local passions. | A 65-member House cannot represent the variety of a nation of millions; only wealthy, prominent men would win, a "natural aristocracy" (Melancton Smith's phrase). |
| Is a bill of rights needed? | No. Congress has only enumerated powers, the ones the Constitution lists, and listing rights could imply it has power over everything not listed. | Yes. Federal laws would override the states' declarations of rights, so jury trial, a free press, and freedom from standing armies were unprotected. |
The Federalist case is best known from The Federalist, 85 essays published in New York newspapers from October 1787 into 1788 under the pen name "Publius" to sway New York's convention. Hamilton wrote about 51, Madison about 29, and John Jay 5. In Federalist No. 10 (November 1787), Madison turned Montesquieu upside down. Factions, he argued, grow from human nature and especially from property: "the most common and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal distribution of property." You cannot remove the causes without destroying liberty, so you control the effects by making the republic large:
Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens . . .
Notice which danger Madison feared most: a majority invading the rights of a minority, exactly what he thought the state legislatures had done with paper-money and debt laws. In Federalist No. 51 he added that the branches must check one another because "Ambition must be made to counteract ambition."
The Anti-Federalists wrote under pen names too, among them "Brutus" (probably New York's Robert Yates), the "Federal Farmer," and "Centinel" (Samuel Bryan of Pennsylvania). Their leaders included Patrick Henry and George Mason of Virginia, Governor George Clinton and Melancton Smith of New York, and Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts. Mason, Gerry and Randolph were the three delegates still present on September 17 who refused to sign; 39 signed. Their fears came from recent experience. Colonists had just fought a war against a distant government that taxed them without consent, quartered standing armies among them, and tried smugglers in admiralty courts without juries, and the Constitution seemed to give a new distant government those same powers.
Support broke down roughly by economic position, with many exceptions. Federalists were strongest in port cities and along the coast, among merchants, creditors, artisans who wanted a national tariff, and Continental Army officers. Anti-Federalists were strongest among small farmers in the interior, debtors, and state politicians. But Henry and Mason were wealthy planters, and urban artisans were mostly Federalists.
Historians have fought over what that pattern means. Charles Beard's An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution (1913) argued that the framers wrote a document protecting their own property, especially government bonds. Forrest McDonald and Robert E. Brown attacked his evidence in the 1950s, and Gordon Wood (1969) recast the debate as one of ideas: Americans rethinking where sovereignty lies and how a republic can survive. Woody Holton (Unruly Americans, 2007) brought economics back, arguing that the framers were reacting against state legislatures that had sided with debtors and taxpayers.
How the promise of a Bill of Rights won ratification
Small states ratified first and fast, because the Senate gave them equal power: Delaware unanimously on December 7, 1787, then New Jersey and Georgia. Pennsylvania's Federalists moved so fast that a crowd dragged two absent Anti-Federalist assemblymen back to the legislature to make a quorum for calling the convention, which ratified 46 to 23 on December 12.
The turning point was Massachusetts, where Shays' Rebellion had just shown how divided the state was. Anti-Federalists held a majority when the convention met. Federalists won over John Hancock and Samuel Adams with a new formula: ratify now and recommend amendments. On February 6, 1788, the convention voted 187 to 168 to ratify, adding:
And as it is the opinion of this Convention that certain amendments & alterations in the said Constitution would remove the fears & quiet the apprehensions of many of the good people of this Commonwealth & more effectually guard against an undue administration of the Federal Government, The Convention do therefore recommend that the following alterations & provisions be introduced into the said Constitution.
Its first recommendation was that all powers not expressly delegated be reserved to the states. Later conventions copied the method. New Hampshire became the ninth state on June 21, 1788, which put the Constitution into effect on paper. But a union without Virginia, the largest state, and New York, which split New England from the rest, could not have worked. Virginia ratified 89 to 79 on June 25 after Henry spent days warning against consolidated power, and New York ratified 30 to 27 on July 26. North Carolina refused to ratify in 1788 and joined only in November 1789, after Congress had sent amendments to the states; Rhode Island followed, 34 to 32, in May 1790.
The Federalists' promise reversed their own argument. In Federalist No. 84, Hamilton had written that bills of rights "are not only unnecessary in the proposed Constitution, but would even be dangerous," since Congress had no power to restrict the press anyway. Madison had called written guarantees "parchment barriers." But he had promised amendments while campaigning for a House seat in early 1789, and on June 8, 1789, he introduced them in Congress. Congress sent twelve to the states in September 1789, and ten were ratified by December 15, 1791. They did two things at once. They named individual rights: speech, press, religion, assembly, the right to bear arms, jury trial, protection against unreasonable searches and against self-incrimination. And they named them as limits on the federal government: the First Amendment begins "Congress shall make no law," and the others forbid federal officials and courts to quarter troops in homes, search without a warrant, or try people without the listed protections. They restricted only the federal government; state governments were bound by their own declarations of rights. The Ninth Amendment answers Hamilton's worry by saying that listing some rights does not deny others, and the Tenth reserves undelegated powers to the states or the people, nearly Massachusetts's first recommendation. Madison chose carefully, though: the amendments limited what the federal government could do to individuals but dropped the structural changes Anti-Federalists wanted most, such as limits on federal taxing power and on a peacetime army. Henry and other Anti-Federalists complained that the amendments left the new government's strength untouched.
Worked examples
Read the excerpt, then identify and describe the author's claim.
It is obviously impracticable in the federal government of these states, to secure all rights of independent sovereignty to each, and yet provide for the interest and safety of all: Individuals entering into society, must give up a share of liberty to preserve the rest. . . . In all our deliberations on this subject we kept steadily in our view, that which appears to us the greatest interest of every true American, the consolidation of our Union, in which is involved our prosperity, felicity, safety, perhaps our national existence.
George Washington, as president of the Constitutional Convention, letter to the president of Congress transmitting the Constitution, September 17, 1787
Show solution
Claim: The states must give up part of their sovereignty to a stronger national government, because only a firmly united Union can secure Americans' prosperity and safety.
How to find it. A claim is the arguable position the author wants you to accept, so look past the topic (the Constitution) to the "must" and "should." Here it is built on an analogy: just as individuals surrender some liberty when they form a society, states must surrender some "independent sovereignty" when they form a nation. The second sentence gives the reason, "the consolidation of our Union," on which "perhaps our national existence" depends.
Describing it. Put the claim in context. Under the Articles each state kept its "sovereignty, freedom, and independence," and the letter answers that arrangement directly. The word "consolidation" is worth noticing because Anti-Federalists used the same word as an accusation: to them a consolidated government was one that had swallowed the states. Washington uses it as praise.
Mr. GERRY, stated the objections which determined him to withhold his name from the Constitution. . . . He could however he said get over all these, if the rights of the Citizens were not rendered insecure 1. by the general power of the Legislature to make what laws they may please to call necessary and proper. 2. raise armies and money without limit. 3. to establish a tribunal without juries, which will be a Star-chamber as to Civil cases.
James Madison, notes on the Constitutional Convention, September 15, 1787
a. Briefly describe Elbridge Gerry's argument in the excerpt.
b. Briefly explain how ONE development before 1787 contributed to the concerns Gerry expresses.
c. Briefly explain ONE way the concerns expressed in the excerpt were addressed in the years 1788 to 1791.
Show solution
a. Gerry argued that the Constitution gave Congress powers broad enough to endanger citizens' rights: the "necessary and proper" clause let Congress decide for itself which laws it needed, it could raise armies and taxes with no limit, and it could set up federal courts that tried civil cases without juries.
b. Gerry's fear of courts without juries came from the colonial crisis. The Sugar Act of 1764 sent smuggling cases to vice-admiralty courts, where a judge appointed by the Crown ruled without a jury, and colonists denounced this as a violation of the rights of Englishmen. A distant government using courts without juries to enforce its laws was exactly what the Revolution had resisted.
c. Federalists in states such as Massachusetts and Virginia won ratification by promising amendments, and Madison introduced them in the First Congress in 1789. The Bill of Rights, ratified in 1791, guaranteed jury trial in criminal cases (Sixth Amendment) and in civil suits over $20 (Seventh Amendment), answering Gerry's third point directly.
Why these earn the points. Part (a) restates the argument in your own words instead of quoting it back. Parts (b) and (c) each name a specific development and tie it to a specific concern in the excerpt (juries), which is what "explain" requires; (c) also stays inside the prompt's dates.
Evaluate the extent to which disagreements over the power of the central government shaped the creation and ratification of the United States Constitution from 1787 to 1791.
Write a thesis, a sentence of context, and an outline of the evidence and reasoning for the body.
Show solution
Thesis: Disagreement over central power shaped the Constitution's creation and ratification to a great extent, since it drove both the large-state and small-state contest in Philadelphia and the Federalist and Anti-Federalist debate in the states; however, the bargains over slavery show that sectional economic interests shaped the document as much as abstract theories of power.
Context: Under the Articles of Confederation, Congress could neither tax nor regulate trade, and after Shays' Rebellion in 1786-1787 many leaders feared that weak government and state majorities threatened property and order.
Body 1, central power in the convention. The Virginia Plan sought a national government with a veto over state laws, and the New Jersey Plan kept equal state votes. The Great Compromise blended the two: a population-based House and an equal Senate. Reasoning: the fight was over whether the government represented people or states, which is a disagreement about central power.
Body 2, central power in ratification. Anti-Federalists such as Patrick Henry and George Mason warned that the "necessary and proper" clause and federal taxing power would consolidate the states into one government, and that the Constitution lacked a bill of rights. Madison's Federalist No. 10 answered that a large republic would control faction. Federalists won Massachusetts (187 to 168) and Virginia (89 to 79) only by promising amendments, and the Bill of Rights (1791), including the Tenth Amendment, was the result. Reasoning: the closest votes turned on fear of central power, and the Bill of Rights was the price of the Constitution.
Body 3, the qualification. The three-fifths clause, the protection of the slave trade until 1808, and the fugitive slave clause came from sectional interest, not from theories of government. The New England votes for the 1808 date were traded for a simple-majority rule on commerce laws, a bargain between economic interests. Reasoning: power disputes framed the debate, but the deals that held the Union together often protected slavery and commerce.
Why it scores. The thesis takes a position on "extent" and previews the reasoning. The context explains why the convention was called. Specific evidence (named plans, people, votes, clauses) counts only when each piece is tied back to the thesis, as each "Reasoning" line does. The qualification in Body 3 is what earns the complexity point.
Where students lose points
On the exam
This topic's skill is identifying and describing claims in sources: questions can set an excerpt from the Federalist papers, an Anti-Federalist writing, or the convention debates, and ask what the author argued, what context produced it, or what resulted. Short-answer questions pair a source with tasks like those in the second example. In essays, ratification and the Bill of Rights are strong evidence for prompts about federal power, rights, or sectional compromise.
Check yourself
Question 1
In 1787-1788, which of the following groups would most likely have opposed ratifying the Constitution?
- A
Philadelphia merchants who wanted a single national tariff policy
- B
Former Continental Army officers still owed back pay by Congress
- C
Backcountry farmers who had benefited from their state's debt-relief and paper-money laws
- D
Investors holding bonds issued by the Confederation Congress
Show answer
C
A stronger national government threatened state laws that eased debts, and interior farmers feared distant rulers they could not control, so they leaned Anti-Federalist. Merchants, officers owed pay, and bondholders all stood to gain from a national government that could tax and regulate trade, which is why they leaned Federalist.
- A
Question 2
Article VII required ratification by special conventions in nine states rather than approval by all thirteen state legislatures. Explain why supporters of the Constitution wanted that rule.
Show answer
Unanimity would have let one state, such as Rhode Island, block the plan, and state legislators stood to lose power to the new government. Conventions elected for the purpose avoided both problems and let Federalists claim the Constitution's authority came directly from the people.
The Articles required every state legislature to approve an amendment, so following them would almost certainly have killed the Constitution. Rhode Island did reject it at first and joined only in 1790, after the government was already running.
Question 3
What was the most direct political effect of the three-fifths clause in the decades after 1787?
- A
It gave enslaved men a partial vote in federal elections.
- B
It made slaveholding states pay most of the federal government's revenue through direct taxes.
- C
It increased the number of House seats and electoral votes held by slaveholding states.
- D
It barred slavery from territories north of the Ohio River.
Show answer
C
Counting three-fifths of the enslaved population for apportionment added House seats, and therefore electoral votes, to slave states while giving enslaved people no voice at all. Choice B is tempting because the clause also applied to direct taxes, but Congress rarely levied them, so representation was the clause's real effect. Choice D describes the Northwest Ordinance.
- A
Question 4
Why were many Anti-Federalists, including Patrick Henry, dissatisfied with the Bill of Rights that Madison guided through Congress?
Show answer
Madison's amendments barred the federal government from violating specific individual rights, but they left its core powers (to tax, raise armies, regulate commerce and run federal courts) as the Constitution granted them. The structural changes Anti-Federalists wanted most, such as limits on federal taxation and standing armies, were left out.
Anti-Federalists objected to the Constitution's structure as much as to its silence on rights. Madison chose amendments that would quiet popular fears without weakening the new government, and the Tenth Amendment's reservation of powers did not shrink any power the Constitution actually granted.
Question 5
Which statement best describes how Federalist No. 10 answered the Anti-Federalist claim that republics must be small?
- A
A small republic is safer because citizens can watch their representatives closely.
- B
A large republic contains so many competing interests that no single faction is likely to form an oppressive majority.
- C
A large republic is safe only if a written bill of rights limits what majorities can do.
- D
Factions can be eliminated by giving every citizen the same opinions and interests.
Show answer
B
Madison reversed Montesquieu: size multiplies interests, and that diversity protects minorities. Choice A is the Anti-Federalist position he was rebutting, and choice D is a cure for faction that Madison explicitly rejected because it would destroy liberty.
- A